Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : STEPPRIE 75A00 00120001-6



		25X1
Copy No.	10	•

19 February 1951

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Working Paper!!!

Dry Run Only

DOCUMENT NO	
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.	0.514
CLAGS, CHANGED TO: TS S CONTRACT REVIEW DATE:	25X1
AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE 12-15 REVIEWER:]

25X1

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

State Department review completed

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01/16: CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-6

25X1A Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-

			Gleneral	***
25X1,	1.	Dutch official report (page 1).	rts European re-evaluation of So	oviet intentions
20,(1				
·				
« • L		i.		
-			YUGOSLAVIA	
	4.	Tito desires to re	main aloof from West (page 2).	
25X1				
23/(1				
	,		USSR	
	7.	Commentary on St (page 4).	alin's interview with a Pravda o	correspondent
·				
				,
•				
		25X1A	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	\neg

GENERAL

	1.	Dutch official reports European re-evaluation of Soviet intentions:
25X1A		chief advisers, reports that European higher civil and military circles are coming to believe that, except for the possibility of a Satellite attack against Yugoslavia, a direct attack against Western Europe is extremely unlikely within the near future. In their opinion, Soviet leaders are greatly concerned over the progress of NATO and the rise of national deviation tendencies in Western European Communist Parties and are, as a result, secretly passing to the defensive. Although the urgency for a speedup of European defense is still generally recognized, pointed out that these circles feel a breathing space is more possible than is believed in the US.
		comment: is probably in a position to judge the changing currents of European opinion, and his report may reflect the views of certain Dutch Socialists who believe in a defense program commensurate with Dutch recovery needs. While there have been reports from other sources reflecting lessened apprehension in European circles: regarding Soviet intentions, this is the first Dutch report of this nature.
25X1		
		25X1A

25X1 YUGOSLAVIA Tito desires to remain aloof from West: In recent conversations with US Assistant 25X1A Secretary of State Perkins, Tito pointed out that he would remain aloof from any bloc so that the Yugoslav people, in the event of a Cominform attack, would not blame their government for provoking the action. To avoid a public debate regarding Yugoslav military supplies, Tito said he hoped to obtain them through commercial channels by means of long-term loans. He added, however, that if he became convinced that a Cominform attack was imminent, this caution might vanish. 25X1A

Approved for Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-6

	Approved Fo	or Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-6
ث <u>س</u>	•	
L		
		USSR
7	Commentary	Stalin's interview with a Pravda correspondent:
	Commentary of	The Stalin interview with a Prayda correspondent
5X1A		generally adheres closely to often repeated Communist propaganda themes. Its emphasis on the 'peace cam-
		efforts to contrast the aggressive West with the peace- ay be timed to coincide with the forthcoming East Berlin
	sented in Comr	World Peace Council. This organization has been reprenunist propaganda as much more representative of the
	ganization acti	orld than the UN. The denunciation of the UN as an or- ng for "American aggressors" may be intended to set
	Council and to	the expected moves for "peace" by the World Peace raise the prestige of that organization. The absence of
		to those Middle and Far East countries which voted to ist China an aggressor contrasts sharply with the
		- 4 -
	25X1A	·
	20/(1/(

25X1

designation of the North Atlantic Pact and Latin American countries as the "aggressive core" of the UN. In his prediction that the Anglo-American forces in Korea would ultimately be defeated because of the unpopularity of the war among American and British soldiers, Stalin attempts to differentiate between peoples and their "reactionary" governments -- a normal Communist technique that has played an important part in the world "peace" campaign. Stalin's prediction may likewise have directed toward encouraging China in connection with the current celebration of the first anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty.

The Soviet leader has made previous public statements regarding the inevitability of war and the possibility of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the capitalist and communist worlds. In these statements, Stalin has implied that war was not inevitable if the capitalist world would cooperate. The latest statement adds the point that while war is not inevitable, "at least not at the present time," it may become so unless the peoples of the world (perhaps through the World Peace Council) take the cause of peace into their own hands and defend it to the end.

Comment in Stalin's speech on the German question is significantly absent.